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 Unanswered Questions: Modernizing the US Nuclear Arsenal and Forces? 
 
Todd Royal 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The US strategic nuclear triad, consisting of land-based heavy bombers, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, has been the ultimate 
provider of security for the US and its allies since the end of World War II.  But with 
decades of neglect, it is time for the US government to decide what it wants to do with 
the triad where recent problems have put the nuclear arsenal in a national light.  This 
paper will analyze these new revelations and challenges the US faces for its nuclear 
forces. 
 
Introduction 
As long as nuclear weapons exist within the US nuclear posture, and other powers in the 
world have these weapons, they must be safe, secure, and effective to provide for the 
general defense and deterrence for the US and our allies.  This is done for strategic 
effectiveness, and to reassure the world community of the US commitment to global 
security.1  Further, when the weaponry is brought up to date, not only can future threats 
be hedged against, but there is also not as significant a need for a large non-deployed 
stockpile.2  The US Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR) from April 2010 calls for 
much needed infrastructure improvement that will possibly take decades to implement, 
spanning multiple administrations, and sessions of Congress.  In April 2010, former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates transferred nearly $5 billion from the Department of 
Defense to the Department of Energy for modernization.  This investment represented the 
beginning of credible improvements to the nuclear arsenal, sustained deterrence 
effectiveness, and building a nuclear infrastructure for the twenty first century.3   
This paper will examine the reasons for modernization of the US nuclear arsenal, 
and why updating the weapons and delivery system will give US forces the expanded 
capacity that may be a desirable factor, as opposed to the inordinate amount the US 
spends on maintaining obsolete weapon systems and facilities.  This paper will bring up 
more questions than answers, as recent problems for the arsenal have come to light, and 
will be highlighted in this document.  The cost associated with upgrading and 
modernizing its arsenal is not a zero-sum game, because if the US is going to spend a 
significant amount of money, there should be a significant benefit.  According to a 1998 
Brookings Institution Report, in the last half of the twentieth century the US spent nearly 
$8 trillion dollars on nuclear weapons, which represented nearly a third of its total 
military spending during the Cold War.4  It is time for the US to begin completely 
overhauling its nuclear complex, which is what Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
announced on November 15, 2014, in an effort to improve management and 
                                                        
1
 Department of Defense.  Nuclear Posture Review Report.  April 2010.  Page i. 
2
 Department of Defense.  Ibid.  April 2010.  Page i. 
3
 Department of Defense.  Ibid.  April 2010.  Page i. 
4
 Silverberg, David, “$5.5 trillion well spent,” Brookings, July 8, 1998. 
http://www.brookings.edu/about/project/archive/nucweapons/silverberg 
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infrastructure security of the nation’s nuclear stockpile while beginning the 
modernization process.5 
 
Hagel Begins Revamping All Phases Of Nuclear Weaponry 
Making nuclear weapons a capable and effective deterrent is not the only reason for 
modernization. There is also the issue of improving management at all levels of our 
stockpile and revitalizing the forces quality of life for those who maintain them.6  
Although no longer in practice, until 1992 the US nuclear stockpile was maintained 
through warhead replacement, which came from design to test, then deployment for use 
and deterrence until retirement of the warhead when a successor came on-line.7  Since 
1992, the US has stopped testing nuclear weapons, and has no longer maintained and 
certified the warheads as safe and reliable.8  There has been a Department of Defense 
program, Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is a Congressional mandate, and in 
theory will extend the life of refurbished warheads back to original specifications.9  This 
low-maintenance approach, in addition to low troop morale and personnel challenges 
within top ranks of the nuclear command structure, are reasons changes were begun 
under Gates and why Hagel has taken on the task of what to do with our nuclear complex 
with continued deterioration happening at all levels.   
 Hagel has concluded the problems in the nation’s nuclear forces are rooted in a 
lack of investment, inattention by high-level leaders, and sagging morale.  This forced 
him to order top-to-bottom changes.  He has vowed to invest billions of dollars to fix 
management and modernization of the world’s most deadly weapons.  Hagel ordered two 
lengthy reviews the summer of 2014 after a series of stories by the Associated Press 
revealed numerous problems in management, morale, security, and safety, which led to 
several firings, demotions, and other disciplinary actions against a range of Air Force 
personnel from Generals to Airmen.10  Hagel’s reviews concluded the structure of US 
nuclear forces is so incoherent that it cannot be properly managed in its current form, and 
these problems explain why top-level officials are often unaware of trouble.11  Hagel’s 
reviews found combinations of fundamental flaws in all areas of the arsenal, but also 
issues that cannot be easily fixed by bureaucratic shuffling or more money.  Reviews 
ordered by the Pentagon, “found evidence of systematic problems that if not addressed 
could undermine the safety, security, and effectiveness of elements of the force in the 
future.”12  Hagel’s findings also showed “a consistent lack of investment and support for 
our nuclear forces over far too many years has left us with too little margin to cope with 
mounting stresses.”13   
                                                        
5
 Brannen, Kate, “Hagel revamps US Nuclear Program,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2014.  
http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/11/14/hagel_revamps_us_nuclear_program 
6
 Bannen, Ibid, 2014. 
7
 Department of Defense.  Ibid.  Page 37.   
8
 Department of Defense.  Ibid.  Page 37. 
9
 Department of Defense.  Ibid.  Page 38. 
10
 Burns, Robert, “Hagel to order nuke force overhaul to fix failures,” AP, November 13, 2014.  
http://news.yahoo.com/hagel-order-nuke-force-overhaul-fix-failures-010143821 --politics.html 
11
 AP.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
12
 AP.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
13
 AP.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
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 Hagel, with Pentagon backing, found our nuclear forces are meeting demands that 
are broad in scope, but are becoming harder to cope with the mission of deterrence, safety 
of American military personnel, and protecting the American people.14  But a lack of 
funding has not been the biggest issue.  In President Obama’s first year in office, his 
Administration negotiated the New Start Treaty (START 3) with the Russian Federation 
that slated for the arsenal to be reduced to 1,500 weapons, along with a corresponding 
reduction of the size of the Russian arsenal.15  In a political move to assist ratifying the 
treaty, President Obama agreed to provide the Pentagon an extra $185 billion over 10 
years for nuclear weapons.16  Nonetheless, Hagel commented to reporters on November 
14, 2014, “[T]he root cause of nuclear decline has been a lack of sustained focus, 
attention and resources resulting in a pervasive sense that a career in the nuclear 
enterprise offers too few opportunities for growth and advancement.”17   
 The degree of decay is becoming unprecedented for the US.  Pentagon reviews 
found undeniable decay in the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force.  
Maintenance crews had access to only one tool set required to tighten bolts on the 
Minuteman 3 missile warhead.  A single tool was being used by maintenance crews at all 
three ICBM bases, and these bases had to share the tool via Federal Express delivery, 
Pentagon officials stated in Hagel’s reports.18  Given these types of issues, American 
taxpayers should be asking the President, Secretary of Defense, and Congress where the 
$185 billion dollars has been allocated.  Why do three bases that house the most deadly 
weapons in the history of mankind share tools through overnight delivery?  Hagel has 
begun making significant moves to address problems, but will it be enough? 
 Secretary Hagel has authorized the Air Force, which controls the US nuclear 
arsenal, to put a 4-star General in command of the nuclear forces.  Currently the top Air 
Force nuclear commander in charge of the 450 Minuteman ICBMs and the nuclear 
bomber forces is 3-star Lieutenant General Stephen Wilson.  After reviewing Pentagon 
reports, Hagel ordered that a 4-star General to have an office at Air Force headquarters in 
the Pentagon.19  An admirable addition, but still no one can account for the $185 billion 
dollars appropriated over 10 years that were intended to solve these problems.  Hagel in 
November 2014 stated at the Reagan Library Defense Forum that despite tight Pentagon 
budget due to sequestration, billions more will be needed over the next five years to 
upgrade equipment.20  He’s proposed three measures.  The first is replacing Vietnam-era 
UH-1 Huey helicopter fleet relied upon by security personnel at ICBM bases; The Air 
Force has concluded they are out of date, but has not addressed the issue of why other 
issues had higher budget priority. The second is an additional investment of $1 to $10 
billion for improvement; Hagel, Defense officials, the President, or Congress hasn’t 
                                                        
14
 De Luce, Dan, “Troubled US nuclear force needs reforms, funds: Hagel,” AFP, November 14, 2014.  
http://news.yahoo.com/hagel-unveil-reforms-troubled-us-nuclear-force-055520379.html 
15
 Maddow, Rachel, Drift, (New York, NY, Broadway Paperbacks), Page 239.  April 13, 2012 
16
 Maddow.  Ibid.  Page 239.  April 2012. 
17
 De Luce.  Ibid.  2014. 
18
 De Luce.  Ibid.  2014. 
19
 De Luce.  Ibid.  2014 
20
 Alexander, David, “Hagel reassures troops of US commitment to nuclear arms mission,” Reuters, 
November 15, 2014.  http://news.yahoo.com/hagel-reassures-troops-u-commitment-nuclear-arms-mission-
052814631.html 
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determined an exact number. 21 The third is authorization for the Navy to hire more 
civilians to assist Navy personnel to maintain nuclear submarines and the Air Force to 
add 1,100 troops and civilians to its nuclear command structure to fill gaps in manpower 
and competence levels;22  This authorization comes in light of scandals tarring the 
nuclear forces that occurred at land-based missile centers maintained by Air Force crews, 
which will be discussed later in this paper.23  Hagel has begun asking why these problems 
have occurred, or if these problems are related to sequestration.  When enemies and allies 
of the US read about these problems after tens of billions have been set aside, allies could 
wonder what is happening to the US, and enemies could ponder how they can capitalize 
upon our mistakes. 
 
Why Has This Happened? 
The post 9/11 focus on counterterrorism and the breakup of the former Soviet Union has 
seemingly made the days of needing nuclear weapons an anachronism. 24  Nuclear 
weapons with the potential to end humanity and a strategy of deterrence known as 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) should have faded into history.  Is this perceived 
need for catastrophic weaponry still necessary?  Has the need ever gone away?  
Seemingly the demand still exists, although fortunately the world has not seen a large 
conventional war, the scale of World War I or II, since the advent of nuclear deterrence.25  
The US and its allies should be concerned about the eroding US nuclear standards for the 
sake of humanity’s peaceful existence.   
 There have been concerns about slipping standards of the nuclear forces since the 
end of the Cold War, and in 2008, Secretary Gates ordered a review similar to reviews 
Hagel concluded this past summer.26  When asked why at a Pentagon briefing the week 
of November 10, Hagel blamed the problem of nuclear force deterioration on the military 
being focused on two large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which took “our eye off 
the ball,” when it came to the nuclear triad.27  This has supposedly forced the US to 
become complacent when it came to the role of nuclear weapons, but still doesn’t answer 
the question of where the $185 billion went that was allocated to fix these above-
mentioned problems.  Nowhere in the START 3 negotiations was it mentioned the 
problems with our nuclear weapons were the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that the 
President pulled out of Iraq in 2012 where it was considered a complete success 
                                                        
21 Alexander.  Ibid.  2014 
22
 De Luce.  Ibid.  2014. 
23
 Associated Press (no author stated), “Key findings in AP nuclear missile probe,” AP, November 14, 
2014.  http://news.yahoo.com/key-findings-ap-nuclear-missiles-corps-probe-091952296.html 
24
 White House National Security Staff for President George W. Bush, White House National Security 
Strategy, White House of President George W. Bush, Page 1, September 2002.  
http://nssarchive.us.nssr/2002.pdf 
25
 Coyle, James Dr., “Fall 2014 Lectures MPP.644 National Security and Freedom,” Pepperdine School of 
Public Policy, August-November 2014. 
26
 Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapon 
Management.  December 2008.  Chairman’s opening letter to Secretary Robert M. Gates and full report.  
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/phaseiireportfinal.pdf 
27
 Hennigan, W.J., “Major overhaul of nuclear force planned to improve security and morale,” Los Angeles 
Times, November 25, 2014. http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-81972191 
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according to him.28  Why then did Hagel blame wars that are either completed (Iraq) or 
nearing completion (Afghanistan)?  These questions also do not answer the question of 
why our nuclear forces are in disarray.  Hagel also added, “If we don’t pay attention to 
this, if we don’t fix this, eventually there will get to the point where there will be 
questions about our security.”29   
 Arms control advocates argue morale problems are inevitable when crews sense 
their mission is obsolete, and that it is time to scale back the costly arsenal.  Hagel 
believes the opposite when he said, “the nuclear weapons forces, which cost more than 
$15 billion annually, would need a 10% increase in funding each year over the next five 
years.  That would be more than $7.5 billion over the period.”30  On November 14, 2014, 
Hagel visited Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota where he sought to assure troops to 
the commitment of revitalizing the forces and implementing job improvement and 
working conditions.31  He further sought to reassure the troops of the deterrence factor 
these troops bring to the US and our allies.  But can money solve the problem when the 
Pentagon has already begun spending millions to improve conditions at Minot, which is 
the only base to house nuclear bombers and missiles?  These millions are going towards 
cleaning the launch and control centers built in the 1960s.  Millions are being spent at 
Hagel’s request without ever mentioning various wars or billions the President allocated 
toward the START 3 treaty approval.  Can it be concluded there are bigger issues than 
budget sizes, facility conditions, and troop morale?  Outside defense analysts believe that 
that is the case. 
 While many defense analysts believe Hagel’s reviews were long overdue; they 
also believe this could renew US nuclear weaponry focus after years of neglect.32  Others 
are skeptical, because spending more money on Cold War era nuclear weapons for 
deterrence while sloppy accounting takes place could send the wrong message that 
money is the issue.  Attempting to throw more money at the problem will not solve the 
issues without addressing the limited role these weapons have in US security policy – 
particularly under President Obama, who has called for complete nuclear disarmament.33  
The total number of ICBMs is being reduced under START 3 where the US will have 
400 deployed ICBMs while kept in 450 silos.  Maintaining this infrastructure of the 
nuclear triad faces renewed criticism in today’s budget environment, but large amounts of 
unaccounted for monies while budgets are being cut are decisions that should be justified 
by the White House.  Critics believe there is not a decent, understandable, or plausible 
reason how these weapons will ever be fired.  Then questions remain as for why the US 
maintains them.  Is it truly for deterrence where the US doesn’t have a choice?   
 Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the 
Monterrey Institute of International Studies states that the problem with our nuclear 
                                                        
28
 Pavlich, Katie, “President Who Pulled US Troops Out of Iraq Says Idea He Pulled Troops Out of Iraq is 
Bogus,” Townhall.com, August 11, 2014.  http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/08/11/president-
who-pulled-troops-out-of-iraq-says-he-didn’t-pull-troops-out-of-iraq-n1877290 
29
 Knickerbocker, Brad, “Chuck Hagel orders fixes to ‘systemic problems’ in US Nuclear Arsenal,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 14, 2014.  http://news.yahoo.com/chuck-hagel-order-fixes-systemic-
problems-us-nuclear-184415518.html 
30
 Alexander.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
31
 Alexander.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
32
 Bannen.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
33
 Department of Defense.  Ibid.  November 2010.  Page i. 
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weapons infrastructure and design is, “there is no mission and more money can’t invent 
one.”34   Lewis has counted six or seven reports since 2006 that have reached the same 
conclusions that Hagel has begun acting upon.  Each report states the problem, yet 
nothing seems to change,35 since nonproliferation and elimination of all nuclear weapons 
is part of the NPR.36   Lewis’ comments about the obsolete nature of these weapons are 
important to understand how the US should begin asking what is going to happen to these 
weapons moving forward.   
 Another expert in the field of disarmament and a critic of nuclear weapons as 
deterrence, Kingston Reif, Director of Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the 
Arms Control Association, believes high-level Pentagon attention is immediately 
required for the problems Hagel has outlined, but he states:  
 
It’s unlikely that these problems can be solved by more money, more 
stars, more organizational changes, reducing burdens on airmen, or 
recommitting to the importance of nuclear deterrence without 
addressing the underlying problem.  The reality is that nuclear weapons 
play an increasingly limited role in US national security policy, but our 
arsenal is still configured and sized for a Cold War world that no longer 
exists.37   
 
These questions and statements about nuclear validation have truth concerning what the 
US wants to do about nuclear weapons, but none of these experts seem to address what 
the US accomplishes by disarmament, including President Obama, when the Chinese, 
Russians, and even the Iranians deem these weapons vitally important.38  Others believe 
the ICBMs are in decline because of policy disagreements between the Republicans in 
Congress and the White House.39  Still, money is important and according to American 
Enterprise Institute fellow MacKenzie Eaglen:  
 
While more money is needed as part of the solution, this is much easier 
said than done, and there is a reason the triad has basically stalled out in 
any maintenance, testing or investment in future capabilities over the 
past six years, because Congress and the President are at irreconcilable 
odds over nuclear disarmament and strategic nuclear deterrence 
policies.40   
 
 To secure more funding for modernization to the military’s nuclear forces would 
have required Hagel to win policy battles with the White House, and no one knows what 
Hagel’s replacement will want to accomplish with the triad’s modernization.  Secretary 
                                                        
34
 Bannen.  Ibid.  November 2014 
35
 Bannen.  Ibid.  November 2014 
36
 Defense Department.  Nuclear Posture Review Report.  April 2010. 
37
 Bannen.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
38
 Pearl, Jonathan, Forecasting Zero:  US Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament.  
(Carlisle, PA:  US Army War College), complete document.  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1092 
39
 Bannen.  Ibid.  November 2014. 
40
 Pavlich.  Ibid.  August 2014. 
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Gates attempted some reforms when he fired civilian and military leaders of the Air 
Force in 2008 after nuclear triggers were shipped to Taiwan without proper authorization, 
and a B-52 bomber crew unknowingly flew six nuclear warheads across US airspace.  
These failures have been a theme since 2006, but these are only the tip of the iceberg for 
what has taken place recently with our nuclear arsenal. 
 
Disturbing Incidents And Why Something Has To Be Done 
This cascade of incompetence, and embarrassing stories show the nuclear arsenal has 
problems of decay within the force.  An AP report showed personnel burnout, 
misconduct throughout the Air Force at all levels, and missile security on outdated 
weaponry and infrastructure that was considered secure is severely lacking.  Thirteen 
problems were identified.   
Four ICBM launch officers were disciplined for violating security rules when they 
opened a blast door to their underground command post while one crewmember was 
asleep on the job.  The week of November 2, 2014 the Air Force fired two nuclear 
commanders and disciplined another over leadership lapses as top Air Force officials are 
attempting to bring order to the ICBM force.  The same week, Colonel Carl Jones, Vice 
Commander of the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force base in Wyoming was 
relieved of duty for incompetence.  In February 2014, the Air Force announced it was 
investigating cheating on exams at an unnamed ICBM base, and another investigation 
into drug use by missile crewmembers.   
In April 2013, 19 nuclear launch officers of the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air 
Force Base in North Dakota were taken off duty when they were found unfit to serve and 
in need of basic remedial training since their performance were considered sub-par.  The 
341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana failed safety-and-security 
inspections, and nine days later the officer in charge of base security was fired for poor 
job performance.  An internal Air Force report documenting the Malmstrom inspection 
issues, obtained by the AP revealed the security forces at the base did not respond 
properly to a simulated, hostile takeover of a nuclear silo housing live weapons, and even 
though, the Air Force has since implemented measures to improve security forces 
training it is still unknown if the changes are adequate enough.   
In March 2014 the Air Force fired nine mid-level commanders, supervisors, and 
allowed a senior commander to resign while disciplining dozens of junior officers in 
response to the exam cheating at Malmstrom.  On November 3, 2014 the Air Force fired 
a missile squadron commander at Minot, and reassigned the Vice Commander of the 90th 
Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force base to a non-command staff position.  Further, a 
colonel in charge of all three-missile squadrons at Minot was given administrative 
punishment, but not relieved of command for unnamed reasons.   
The 13 mentioned actions, which are only some of the most serious ones, spurred 
Hagel on November 14, 2014 to order top-down changes for how the US nuclear triad 
and infrastructure would be managed and operated.41  The Pentagon under Hagel’s 
leadership released its own findings for public consumption, which will be reviewed in 
the next section. 
                                                        
41
 Knickerbocker.  Ibid.  November 2014. This footnote is for point 1-14, from pages 11-13 of this paper.  
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Pentagon Review Findings 
After concluding that serious problems existed within the Air Force, and that overall 
nuclear security was lacking the nuclear arsenal was found to have problems in the areas 
of operation and oversight and in additional need of modernization.  The Pentagon 
ordered an external review, headed by retired senior Air Force and Navy officers to 
augment the Pentagon review.  The initial findings of the Pentagon report for public 
consumption noted, “...challenges resulting from being understaffed, under-resourced and 
reliant on an aging and fragile supporting infrastructure in an over-inspected and overly 
risk averse environment.”42  Additionally, “both reports (Pentagon interval reviews) 
identified serious issues with potential real world consequences if not addressed – some 
of which require long-term and permanent cultural and structural changes.”43  The 
Pentagon report described these problems as: Lines being blurred between accountability 
and a level of perfection never being achieved; Inadequate facilities and equipment; An 
aging civilian workforce in unspecified Naval shipyards; A lack of promotional 
opportunities for nuclear force personnel, as nuclear military officers and enlisted 
personnel are specialized in such a way that institutional constraints place restrictions 
against advancement in these military careers; Submarine crew stress created by shipyard 
shortfalls at unnamed shipyards and; The burden created on nuclear forces by risk-averse 
implementation of personnel reliability programs, although it was not explained what this 
means for nuclear forces, which continues a theme of vague policy recommendations for 
all areas of the nuclear triad.44 
 Hans Kristensen, a nuclear expert with the Federation of American Scientists told 
the Associated Press in a recurring theme that money wouldn’t fix these issues.  
Kristensen said:  
 
Throwing money after problems may fix some technical issues, but it is 
unlikely to resolve the dissolution that must come from sitting in a silo 
hole in the Midwest with missiles on high alert to respond to a nuclear 
attack that is unlikely to ever come.45  
 
While this expert analysis is important, none of these experts have answers for what to do 
with a Cold War acting Russia,46 and what takes the place of nuclear deterrence.  Those 
answers never seem to be addressed, and the Pentagon report does not address the 
limitations of the START 3 treaty with Russia, which according to Forbes contributor 
James Conca, limits the ability of the US to develop and modernize nuclear weapons.47  
                                                        
42
 Knickerbocker.  Ibid.  November 2014 
43
 Knickerbocker.  Ibid.  November 2014 
44
 Knickerbocker.  Ibid.  November 2014.  For points 1-6 on pages 13-14. 
45
 Knickerbocker.  Ibid.  November 2014 
46
 Mardiste, David, and Saul, Jonathan, “NATO scrambles jets 400 times as Russian air activity jumps,” 
Reuters, November 20, 2014.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/20/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-
stoltenberg-idUSKCNOj41 
h520141120 
47
 Jones, Michelle, “World War 3:  Would Russian Win?”  Valuewalk.com, November 21, 2014.  
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/11/world-war-3-russia-win/ 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
 
 9 
The issues of nuclear overhaul with START 3 limitations have to be considered when the 
Pentagon, Hagel, and the new incoming Defense Secretary are putting together policy 
actions for the President. 
 
Pentagon Recommendations 
Hagel’s internal reviews of the Defense Department resulted in 100 recommendations to 
improve the nuclear forces. This section will highlight the most important improvements 
identified, beginning with a recommendation to increase the force’s nuclear oversight and 
understanding of the deterrent leadership structure, while reducing the administrative 
burden imposed upon them.  Other points included improving and sustaining current 
equipment, changing “the culture of micromanagement,” boosting morale, and improving 
the manner in which training and inspections are conducted.48  Furthermore, improving 
and sustaining security forces at bases while the nuclear triad is being modernized was 
also on the list.  
Hagel established the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) to 
establish senior leadership accountability, and to bring all command structure elements of 
the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise.  This group will consist of senior leaders 
responsible for “training, funding, and implementing the nuclear mission.”49   
Hagel also directed his office and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
(CAPE) to lead an effort to track and assess each of the 100 recommendations from the 
internal and external reviews.  Admiral Cecil D. Haney, Commander of the US Strategic 
Command, will begin “conducting quarterly nuclear force readiness reviews focused on 
critical resources required for the mission.”50  Admiral Haney has refined his reporting to 
include nuclear infrastructure sustainability while adding nuclear command, control, and 
communications to his force readiness report.  The report was confusing in this area 
because it mentions that “this approach broadens readiness taking into account a more 
holistic view of the health of the force,” but it never explains the correlation between 
holistic views and nuclear readiness.51 As a result of the reviews, it was also determined 
that the Navy would have consolidated oversight of the nuclear mission under the 
Director of Strategic Systems Programs.   
Hagel has ordered the Air Force to make organizational changes to ICBM 
operation groups, consistent crew training, and scheduling hands-on-training for crew 
commanders who are now empowered for the responsibility and proficiency of their 
nuclear crews.  This order is to integrate Air Force human capital while managing talent 
with the goal of delivering correct personnel to the proper place and time utilizing 
specific skills and procedures.  This point was so broad it was hard to define exactly what 
this means. 
                                                        
48 Welch, Larry D. & Harvey, John C., (2014) Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear 
Enterprise Washington, DC: Retrieved from Department of Defense website: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Independent-Nuclear-Enterprise-Review-Report-30-June-2014.pdf 
49 Welch & Harvey Ibid. 2 Jun 2014  
50 US Department of Defense. (2014). Fact Sheet: Implementing Changes to the Nuclear Enterprise. 
Washington, DC: Retrieved from Department of Defense website: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/NER-Fact-
Sheet.pdf 
51 US Department of Defense Ibid. 2014 
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The Air Force also received Hagel’s orders to elevate the rank of Global Strike 
Command from a “4-star billet and HQ USAF Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 
Integration (AF/A-10) to a 3-star billet in order to ensure their rank is commensurate with 
the importance of the mission.”52  Note this part of the Hagel’s report never addresses 
why lesser ranking officers were overseeing this part of the military’s nuclear command 
structure in the first place; it never asks why the President, Secretary of Defense, and 
Joint Chiefs failed to raise the issue.  Instead it identifies the plan on a go-forward basis, 
while conveniently remaining silent on the factors that led to the grave oversight in the 
command structure. 
The Air Force has revised proficiency test scoring for missileers to pass/fail from 
previous expectations where crewmembers had to score one hundred percent on every 
test to advance in their chosen nuclear career path.  The Air Force also incentivized pay 
for ICBM field operations and nuclear force specialties to add allure for individuals on 
the nuclear force career track.  Once Congress approves the FY15 budget, a further 
incentive will include a provision for nuclear personnel to receive back pay and 
additional bonuses for being on the nuclear career track.  
The Joint Chiefs staff will begin providing training that is standardized across all 
levels of the nuclear forces for Pentagon inspectors to certify service members on the 
Personnel Reliability Program.  This is being implemented to do away with repetitive 
procedures that tax existing personnel across the nuclear enterprise. 
At the Pentagon, the Personnel Reliability Program will be under new guidelines.  
Pentagon inspectors will have to take the professional judgment of medical professionals 
and no longer be allowed to penalize nuclear force personnel because of medical or 
psychological problems.   
On the administrative front, the Navy also established a new program called 
Reduce Administrative Distractions (RAD), which aimed to streamline or eliminate 
administrative burdens, instructions and training of sailors serving on nuclear fleets.  
Feedback was solicited from the affected sailors in an effort to address their specific 
challenges. Although this section of Hagel’s report was forward thinking, it simply called 
for the allocation of resources to address the problem at hand, while neglecting to identify 
the root causes of the problem.  The report also failed to make a distinct connection 
between the outcome of this program and the improvement of nuclear readiness and 
deterrence.  Instead, additional layers of bureaucracy and Pentagon management were 
established, but it is not clear that problems will be solved by these new initiatives.    
Deficiencies in infrastructure and equipment were critical issues identified in 
Hagel’s reviews.  As a result, the Navy will work toward infrastructure recapitalization at 
public nuclear shipyards and Strategic Nuclear Weapon Facilities, but the Pentagon’s 
report does not explain specific infrastructure revitalization programs.  Naval nuclear 
reactors will replace two training platforms (the report doesn’t specify what is a platform 
compared to a live nuclear reactor) that have reached the end of their maintenance 
capability, while refueling a third training platform.  These enhancements are designed to 
incorporate simulation technology for nuclear training while augmenting training 
capacity for all nuclear forces. 
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An Air Force Improvement Program through the US Air Force Global Strike 
Command was also established as a result of the report.  This program reallocated $161 
million to ICBM support in FY14, of which $150 million was used to address urgent 
shortfalls to equipment, facilities, and personnel.  
On the fiscal front, the Defense Department conducted a Nuclear Enterprise 
Review (NER) Strategic Portfolio Review to inform the President’s FY16 budget.  A 
Program Review Team assessed unfunded mandates across the entire US nuclear 
spectrum, and presented them to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for consideration, 
although the specific unfunded mandates and requirements were not specified. 
Finally, as this summary is concerned, the reviews recommended that the 
President’s FY16 budget submission provide a detailed analysis of the spending and time 
horizons for various nuclear programs.  Note that this section of Hagel’s report does not 
mention or question what happened to the previous $185 billion allocated to the nuclear 
program, nor does it mention any presidential action related to arsenal and command 
structure problems, and how this will affect the President’s budget.53   
 
Current State Of The World 
The section will examine Russia, China, and Iran, as all three nations are potential 
national security threats to the US.  Wary of a more muscular posture by all three nations, 
but in particular, Russia and China, Hagel said on November 22, 2014, “...the Pentagon 
will make a new push for fresh thinking about how the US can keep and extend its 
military superiority despite tighter budgets and the wear and tear of thirteen years of 
war.”54  Hagel also announced a “defense innovation initiative,”55 to assist offsetting 
military advantages of US adversaries.  Hagel likened these challenges to threats the US 
faced during the Cold War.  A “game-changing strategy,”56 is how Hagel described 
America’s military edge deficit in the face of sequestration, but he didn’t mention his 
recent attempts to overhaul the nuclear triad.  In a memo to Pentagon leaders, Hagel 
outlined how the US must not lose its commanding leadership in military technology, 
stating that: 
Our potential adversaries have been modernizing their militaries, developing and 
proliferating disruptive capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.  This 
represents a clear and growing challenge to our military power, and America and 
its allies prevailed over a determined Soviet adversary by coming together as a 
nation – over decades and across party line – to make long-term, strategic 
investments in innovation and reform of our nation’s military.57   
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James Winnefeld, echoed sentiments recently about Russia 
and China reasserting their power on the world stage to capitalize on America’s 
“distraction,” from Iraq and Afghanistan.58  Winnefeld remarked at the same Reagan 
                                                        
53
 Department of Defense.  Pentagon Fact Sheet.  Summer 2014.  Footnote is for findings on pages 15-19 in 
this paper. 
54
 Burns, Robert, “Hagel:  US needs game-changing military innovation,” AP, November 16, 2014.  
http://news.yahoo.com/hagel-us-needs-game-changing-military-innovation-010423487--politics.html 
55
 Burns.  Ibid.  November 2014 
56
 Burns.  Ibid.  November 2014 
57
 Burns.  Ibid.  November 2014 
58
 Burns.  Ibid.  November 2014 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW – SPRING 2015 
 
 12
National Defense Forum where Hagel spoke, “[The] US overmatch is now in jeopardy.”59  
Both men, but in particular Hagel, have outlined launching new, long-range research and 
development programs for breakthrough in key technologies, including nuclear.  The 
Pentagon under Hagel’s leadership wants to call upon academia and the private sector for 
help.  With regards to US nuclear interests, Hagel likens his approach to the Eisenhower 
Administration’s “New Look”60 program in the 1950’s, which sought to expand the US 
nuclear arsenal to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional military superiority in Eastern 
Europe.  The initiatives have not answered the question of does this money come from 
the previous $185 billion allocated or the new $1 to 10 billion Hagel has asked for from 
the President’s FY15 budget for nuclear modernization across all levels of weaponry, 
infrastructure, and personnel. 
 US officials appear to be deeply concerned that Russia has surpassed the US 
military in nuclear capabilities and superiority, according to James Conca.  Russia has 
been spending money aggressively on developing tactical nuclear weapons, and Putin has 
stated publicly his aim is to develop a guaranteed deterrent to protect against NATO.61  
Moscow also believes its own tactical nuclear weapons are better than the current nuclear 
force projection from either the US or NATO.62  NATO member countries have only 260 
older tactical nuclear weapons sited in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Turkey.  The US has 200 nuclear bombs with an overall capacity of 18 megatons and 
France has 60 atomic bombs.63  Russia has 5,000 nuclear weapons of various tactical 
classes, including Iskander warheads and torpedoes, as well as aerial and artillery 
warheads parked next to European/NATO interests.64   However, the US has only 300 
tactical B-61 bombs that do not take into consideration the imbalance between the two 
nations.65  The State Department has admitted in a report published in September 2014, 
stating that, “Russia for the first time in forty years has passed the US in nuclear weapons 
capability.”66   Conca correctly points out the US will be hard pressed to catch up to 
Russia in any type of nuclear arms modernization race as much of the US arsenal built up 
during the Cold War has been destroyed.67   Conca further elaborates that the US has 
created treaties under previous administrations limiting the ability to develop modern 
nuclear weapons, but nothing as detrimental to US interests as the START 3 treaty “that 
was overwhelmingly favorable to Russia.”68  Yet the US has the ability to pull out of the 
                                                        
59
 Burns.  Ibid.  November 2014 
60
 Burns.  Ibid.  November 2014 
61
 Jones.   Ibid.  November 2014 
62
 Jones.   Ibid.  November 2014 
63
 Conca, James, “Does Russia think their new nuclear weapons could win a war?” Forbes, November 20, 
2014.  http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/11/20/could-russias-new-nuclear-weapons-win-
world-war-iii/ 
64
 Conca.  Ibid.  November 2014 
65
 Jones.   Ibid.  November 2014 
66
 Pravda.ru.  Global Research:  Centre for Global Research from an article by Pravda.ru, “Russia’s 
Strategic Nuclear Force (SNF) More Advanced in Comparison with US Arsenal,” Global Research:  Centre 
for Global Research, November 14, 2014.  http://www.globalresearch.ca/russias-strategic-nuclear-force-
snf-more-advaned-in-comparison-with-us-arsenal/5414012 
67
 Conca.  Ibid.  November 2014 
68
 Conca.  Ibid.  November 2014 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
 
 13
agreement under “extraordinary circumstance that threaten national sovereignty,”69 but 
all indications under the Obama Administration seem to signal that the US will live up to 
its treaty obligations under START 3.   
 Moscow has not been limited in nuclear weapon development and has built next-
generation, long-range cruise missiles that will soon be deployed onto Russian 
submarines in the Black Sea and Caspian flotilla ships.  Russian officials also recently 
revealed they want to send long-range bombers over the Gulf of Mexico, “just for 
practice,” although they do not state whether or not there will be nuclear weapons on 
board.70    
 Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (SNF) are even more advanced when parity is 
considered on warheads.  According to the State Department, the US has 794 vehicles 
and 1,652 warheads, while Russia has 528 carriers for 1,643 strategic nuclear warheads, 
giving them the lead in parity to numbers of nuclear carriers.71  The gap between the two 
nations will grow since Russian defense officials have announced their intention to rearm 
Russia’s SNF with new generation missiles.72  This has occurred because of START 3.  
In the treaty, the nuclear warheads of both nations will be reduced to 1,550 by 2021, and 
the number of carriers of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy 
bombers will be cut to 700 units as well.73  It is the first strategic agreement under a 
Democratic controlled leadership in the Senate where Russia managed to win a huge 
advantage.  Never before had a treaty been signed where the US promised to reduce their 
strategic nuclear potential and the Russians won the opportunity to increase theirs.74  
START 3 removed limitations that existed in previous START 1 and 2 treaties in the 
areas of deployment of mobile ICBMs, the number of multi-charge ICBMs, and the 
possibility to build railway-based ICBMs for the US, but Russia never made one of these 
concessions.  It is unclear why the Obama Administration and the Senate ratified this 
treaty, unless these actions were taken under the belief Russia will never rise to the level 
of a Cold War menace again, even though their recent aggression point towards a Cold 
War mentality.75   
 Dr. Victor Davis Hanson believes times are bleak for Chinese relations with the 
US.   According to Hanson, the Chinese “sense American isolationism, hear parlor talk 
about the US reducing its nuclear arsenal and notice America’s habit of distancing itself 
from its allies.”76  Most disturbing to Dr. Hanson is the correlation between a rising Japan 
in the 1930s and Chinese aggression towards Japan over the Senkaku Islands in Japan, or 
Diaoyu Islands in China, while harboring hatred toward Japan dating back to the 
Japanese treatment of the Chinese during World War II.77  China senses America’s power 
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waning when it comes to protecting Japan, and China welcomes the US reduction of its 
nuclear arsenal.  Meanwhile, China is modernizing its own weaponry, infrastructure, and 
manpower without the United Nations or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
stepping in to check Chinese aggression.78  China’s stated policy is that it will not fire 
nuclear weapons first, and even though China is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), there is major concern that the Chinese sense 
American weakness in the US nuclear strategy at the executive level.  This perceived 
weakness stems from an unbalanced, inconsistent US nuclear triad policy that allows the 
Chinese to continue their march toward weapon modernization. 
 Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy 
testified before the US House Subcommittee on Strategic Force on Friday, October 14, 
2011.  Dr. Schneider elaborated,  
 
China has developed or is in the process of producing two brand-new 
ICBMs, a new ballistic missile submarine, and potentially a new 
bomber, and that China with Russia are experimenting with new types 
of nuclear weapons, including testing low-yield nuclear weapons.79   
 
Adding everything together, it would seem the Chinese are satisfied with its new place in 
the world vis-a-vis the US nuclear equation and modernization.  US options seem limited 
because of START 3, and with China holding trillions in US debt, it has to be asked what 
the US would actually do to counter China’s aggression knowing they could dump 
trillions of US debt on the world market.  While this could crush China, it would also be 
devastating on the US.  More than likely the Obama Administration does not want to find 
out what would happen in the midst of an economic recovery with a 36-year low in US 
labor participation rates.80   
 Iran is negotiating with world powers (P5 + 1, which includes the US, France, 
Great Britain, China, Russia and Germany) currently in Vienna over its nuclear program.  
Over the weekend of November 22, 2014 negotiations were extended because an 
agreement had not been reached.  They were also extended after the March 31, 2015 
deadline had been passed in Lausanne, Switzerland.  Curiously, these announcements 
facilitated little notice, attention, or concern.  George Friedman of Stratfor makes the case 
that the reason why talks were extended seven more months quietly are the US and Iran 
now need one another more than ever fighting the Islamic State.81  Friedman adds,  
 
Both countries want the Islamic State broken.  Both want the 
government in Baghdad to function.  The Americans have no problem 
with Iran guaranteeing security in the south, and the Iranians have no 
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objection to a pro-American Kurdistan so long as they continue to 
dominate southern oil flows.82   
 
However, world powers have presented Iran with an accord that would restrict its nuclear 
program for roughly 10 years, and cap Iran’s legal ability to produce fissile material for a 
weapon during that time.83  If Tehran agrees to the deal then the Russians would be relied 
upon to convert Iran’s current uranium stockpile into fuel rods for peaceful energy use.84  
The accords would also set up an inspection regime that is supposed to follow Tehran’s 
entire supply chain of nuclear material from mining raw material to siphoning materials 
to various nuclear facilities across the nation.85   
 The problem for US ally Israel and her leaders is the worst-case scenario where 
these accords do not work as advertised, and Iran chooses not to abide by the nuclear 
inspections for the entire 10 year period.  Israeli officials are quoted as saying,  
 
Our intelligence agencies aren’t perfect – we didn’t know for years 
about Natanz or Qom, and inspection regimes are certainly not perfect.  
They weren’t in the case of North Korea and it isn’t the case now – and 
Iran’s been giving the IAEA the run around for years about its past 
activities.86   
 
On November 22, 2014, reports from Vienna suggested the P5 + 1 were willing to 
negotiate away full disclosure of any secret work by Tehran.  Israel fears the proposal, 
which only calls for Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to be dismantled for storage and not for 
destruction would be a crushing blow for a lasting peace.87  These accords pushed by 
Secretary of State John Kerry and President Obama would allow the P5 + 1 to grant Iran 
the ability to enrich uranium after ten years and keep most of its nuclear infrastructure in 
place, but thus far the Iranians have rejected the accords in an arrangement that favors 
Tehran by giving them sanctions relief and limited international recognition of their 
nuclear programs.88  Why would Iran, who now according to George Friedman, has 
common interests with the US in fighting IS, reject the deal?  Armin Rosen of Business 
Insider gives two reasons: Iran does not want a deal because Iran is a compartmentalized 
authoritarian state with several competing semi-accountable centers of power, where the 
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, “winces at the possibility of a grand bargain with the 
west;”89  and Iran has the ability to keep extending talks while being allowed access to an 
additional $700 million a month in sanctions relief.90  The other possibility according to 
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Tom Moore, former Senate Committee on Foreign Relations staffer and Luger Center 
senior fellow believes Iran’s strategy towards the US has not changed much over the 
years.  Iran’s stubborn behavior is intentional since it is a highly effective negotiating 
tactic.91   Moore also adds the Western hope of “near-term concessions keep the West 
interested in negotiating – while slowly building its program and resisting a final 
resolution to the nuclear issue.”92  Hanson adds,  
 
Sanctions had crippled Iran to the point that it soon would have grown 
desperate to meet US demands to stop its nuclear enrichment, but 
instead Obama eased trade restrictions just as they were coming to 
fruition.  Iran is now on its way to acquiring a bomb, while supplying 
missiles to Hamas and Hezbollah.93   
  
The question regarding Russia, China, and Iran is why has the Obama 
Administration decided on the policy actions it has taken?  In the most current National 
Security Strategy report from February 2015, President Obama states, “The US will use 
military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our enduring interests demand it.”94 If this 
is the case, then why have the President and his administration taken actions threatening 
US national security according to numerous experts, and reportedly forcing Secretary 
Hagel to resign?95  Hagel seems to be the one high-ranking Obama official attempting to 
speak truthfully about the threat of IS,96 Russia, China, and a host of other issues 
threatening the security and defense of the US nuclear arsenal and US national security.97 
 
Political Dilemma 
In light of Secretary Hagel’s departure from the Obama Administration, of all the 
problems this paper has highlighted the President has taken no official position on all the 
recent issues relating to the US nuclear arsenal.  The President has not highlighted his 
position since new nuclear revelations under Hagel’s tenure have been brought into the 
open.  What the President has stated, and the DOD has reiterated, is that the official 
position of the US is to have a world without nuclear weapons,98 while negotiating with 
Iran and signing treaties with Russia.  While the President states the US can act 
unilaterally if threatened there have not been recent policy statements regarding this 
contradiction between unilateral action and a deteriorating nuclear triad.  Hagel’s 
departure raises further questions of what, if anything, will be done to modernize the 
force.  These political dilemmas, which will eventually need to be addressed by the White 
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House, are burdens that also have to take into consideration the 2010 NPR about official 
US policies regarding nuclear weapons, or a world without nuclear weapons.99  Obama, 
Hagel, the Joint Chiefs or leaders in Congress have not provided answers to these 
questions. 
 
NPR Policy Recommendations 
The case of numerous embarrassing setbacks for the nuclear force was one of many 
reasons Hagel took action.  Disciplinary problems, security flaws, weak morale, 
leadership lapses, numerous high-level firings, $185 billion unaccounted for in Hagel’s 
reviews, and rotting weaponry infrastructure were all motives for significant changes to 
the US nuclear triad.  Does Hagel want billions with no end in sight regarding the costs to 
the benefits?  But what is the official position of the US towards nuclear weapons?  The 
NPR states five key objectives for US nuclear weapons policies and posture: Preventing 
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; Reducing the role of US nuclear weapons in 
US national security strategy; Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced 
nuclear force levels; Strengthening regional deterrence; and sustaining a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear arsenal.”100   
 There is a large issue to be considered moving forward.  If the American public 
hates nuclear bombs along with President Obama, but love the idea of deterrence, how 
does the US go from strategic stability to zero bombs that the President has said, “is the 
goal,”101 when there are actors on the world stage with bad intentions?102  To the 
President’s credit, his administration has consistently supported increased funding for the 
US nuclear complex and deterrent.103  Yet, if the White House is committed to more 
taxpayer dollars why has there been silence from the President?  Billions of dollars have 
been spent, but problems only seem to grow, and the President has stated, “…the US will 
retain its deterrent so long as there is a country with nuclear weapons.”104  What does the 
future hold for the anti-nuclear movement within and out of government?  No one seems 
to know that answer.  For now the NPR clearly states,105 and this paper asserts, all 
features of US nuclear triad, weaponry, and infrastructure need immediate modernization 
and updating, otherwise problems and questions will continue to grow leading to possible 
weakening of US national security and defense. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Writing in the Los Angeles Times, journalist W.J. Hennington writes: 
 
The Obama administration is moving forward with a plan to modernize 
strategic weapons over the next decade, an effort the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates will cost $355 billion.  This comes as the 
Pentagon is under pressure to reduce its budget, and outside experts 
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warn that the modernization could cost more than $1 trillion over the 
next 30 years.106   
 
It should be noted that of all the grave troubles uncovered by AP regarding the nuclear 
triad, and Hagel leaving Defense did the Los Angeles Times mention how the $185 billion 
was going to be used.  There was never any specificity given to this appropriated money 
in the NPR, National Security Strategy, or the President’s budget for FY15 and FY16.  
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from attempting to modernize and 
update the US nuclear arsenal.  One could draw the conclusion that more money will 
solve the problem, but with hundreds of billions of dollars earmarked towards the arsenal, 
it is curious why Hagel would only ask for $1 to 10 billion for what his reviews 
concluded.  Why not take from the monies appropriated to achieve START 3 ratification 
through the Senate or the $355 billion the President has put towards nuclear 
modernization?  After all, the $1 to 10 billion appears to be a pittance relative to the $540 
billion appropriated toward the US nuclear arsenal between the START 3 ratification and 
the monies reported by the Los Angeles Times.  Yet answers for where these funds are 
going to be spent are lacking.  The specifics behind what they will improve in terms of 
US national security and nuclear deterrence are not evident.   Instead, on the heels of 
executive rhetoric that contradicts itself,107 as well as massive appropriations108 that don’t 
seem to align with the overall vision of the executive branch’s goal of disarmament goals, 
policies or even a vision are never put in place.  This seemingly causes the US to allocate 
further taxpayer money hoping that it one day will hit its undefined target.  And it is not 
just money that is being thrown at the problem; it is also a diverse group of former 
Secretaries of Defense that apparently were unable to execute their own personal goals or 
the executive’s convoluted vision for the nuclear arsenal.  All in all, dollars have been 
appropriated, analyses have been performed, reports have been delivered, and results and 
recommendations have been communicated.  But in the end, this is a problem that the 
executive branch, Department of Defense, and Congress do not want to address.  Is the 
triad a Cold War arsenal, an outdated relic of another era, or with recent Russian 
belligerence109 and Chinese emergence,110 are US nuclear weapons a deterrence factor 
that can no longer be ignored?  These questions need to be answered otherwise it is not 
only costly for the taxpayer when it comes to modernization of the arsenal, but also 
dangerous for America.   
 The friction between the White House and Pentagon have been particularly 
pronounced under the Obama Administration the past six years with the President relying 
on a close group of advisors (National Security Advisor Susan Rice, Chief of Staff Denis 
McDonough and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey) with 
degrees of micromanagement, “that’s not bureaucratic, but political.”111  Whether nuclear 
policy can be made under these conditions is one of many challenges the incoming 
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Secretary of Defense will have to overcome.  Questions should be answered and 
strategies fleshed out for the US nuclear complex to be the deterrence that will continue 
to daunt all present and future enemies while reassuring the American people, and our 
allies.  Yet the answers remain as uncertain as ever. 
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